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EDUARDO FERNÁNDEZ-ARIAS and PETER MONTIEL*
This paper addresses the adequacy of post-reform growth in Latin America in the
1990s on the basis of international comparisons as well as historical and other
relevant standards. The paper analytically explores and empirically tests a
number of hypotheses to explain the perceived dissatisfaction with growth perfor-
mance in the region. We find that there is no “growth puzzle” in Latin America.
Growth has not been higher in the post-reform period not because of a failure of
reforms to yield the growth payoff that they should have been expected to do on
the basis of international experience, but because of the combination of an unfa-
vorable external environment with the insufficient depth and breadth of reform. We
also estimate the long-run growth payoff of macroeconomic reforms, the addi-
tional gains that can be achieved by deepening this first generation of reforms, and
the potential payoff from broadening the scope of reform into a second generation
of reforms encompassing deeper structural and institutional areas. [JEL 011, 019,
042, 054]
T
he wave of market-oriented reforms that has swept developing countries in
recent years has been most visible in Latin America, where such reforms have
signified a particularly sharp break with the previous policy regime. The imple-
mentation of such a drastic change in policies has been politically difficult and
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regime would usher in a new era of rapid and widespread economic growth. This
era would reverse the experience of the “lost decade” of the 1980s, which left
many countries in the region with living standards below those achieved at the
beginning of the decade.
Despite the extent and depth of the reforms, however, the acceleration in
economic growth recorded by countries in the region to date has been modest,
and has particularly fallen short of the standards of success established by some
observers. Latin American countries as a group, for example, have not achieved
the rates of growth in the post-reform period that they had previously attained
during the 1970s; have not managed to grow as fast as the East Asian “miracle”
economies to which they are often compared; and have not achieved the absolute
rates of growth considered by informed observers to be necessary for achieving
progress in ameliorating a variety of social problems that were aggravated during
the last decade.1 Moreover, some observers have interpreted whatever gains have
been achieved on the growth front as potentially transitory, reflecting a temporary
boom generated by recovery from crisis or by the excessive exuberance of inter-
national creditors.2
Does this imply that the reforms have failed and should be reconsidered as an
instrument to achieve their primary growth objective? Obviously, a simple
comparison of actual to desired growth rates is not sufficient to answer this ques-
tion, since the desired growth target may simply represent an excessively ambi-
tious policy objective. But even if the desired growth rates are reasonable, an
indictment of the reforms implemented to date for failing to reach them may
nevertheless be unwarranted. This is partly because the size of the growth payoff
depends not only on the merits of reforming but also on the magnitude of the
actual reform effort, and partly because growth is also affected by variables other
than those influenced by recent reform efforts in the region.
Nonetheless, it is important to assess whether the reforms are “working,”
in the sense of delivering an appropriate growth payoff. There are several ways
to approach this question. One could measure, for example, the growth
impetus of reform. This can be computed as the product of the marginal effects
of reforms estimated from international experience and the actual changes in
the set of variables measuring reform in Latin America. This can be evaluated
by some standard of the adequacy of the growth payoff of reform. It may fall
short of that standard during the post-reform period, either because the
marginal effects on growth of unit changes in the set of reform measures
implemented by countries in the region have not been of the expected magni-
tude, or because the reform variables did not register changes of sufficient
magnitude. 
This “growth impetus” approach essentially asks whether the policies under-
taken have delivered the results—that is, the growth acceleration—that they could
1The World Bank, for example, has estimated that the region needs to grow at an average annual
rate of 6 percent to generate the resources required to cope with social and infrastructure needs. See
Edwards (1995).
2Krugman (1995).reasonably have been expected to do. But it does not specifically address whether
the reforms undertaken were in principle capable of attaining the desired growth
rates. Measured in this way, the reforms could have “worked” (in the sense of
having delivered an “appropriate” growth increase) while nonetheless leaving
growth rates in the region far short of their desired levels. Simply measuring the
growth impetus associated with the reforms would provide no indication as to why
this might be so. 
A broader approach to the question takes the desired growth outcome as
its point of departure and seeks to account for the gap between actual and
desired outcomes. A failure of policies to deliver the growth response that they
could reasonably have been expected to do, an insufficient magnitude of
adjustment in the reform variables, and/or unfavorable values of growth deter-
minants other than those captured in the set of reform measures could all
contribute to such a gap. To the extent that the factors contributing to the exis-
tence of a gap between actual and desired post-reform growth rates can be
identified—and their individual contributions to the magnitude of this gap
measured—this broader approach, which we label the growth gap approach,
has the advantage that it can potentially tell more about the possibility of iden-
tifying and adopting measures to close the gap between actual and desired
growth rates.
A paper by Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997, hereafter ELM) imple-
mented the growth impetus approach. They found that the response of economic
growth to reform in Latin America has not, in fact, been disappointing during the
reform period. Rather, given the estimated effects of the reform variables on
economic growth and the actual changes that the values of the reform indicators
have undergone in Latin America during recent years, the change in the observed
rate of growth in the region was not statistically different from what would have
been predicted on the basis of international evidence. 
This paper extends ELM’s work in two ways. First, we broaden the scope
of their analysis of the growth impetus approach in several important direc-
tions—that is, by extending the sample, allowing for dynamic effects of the
reform measures, and broadening the scope of the reform indicators. We then
present new empirical evidence designed to test whether their conclusion that
the reforms have “worked” in the narrow growth impetus sense is robust to
these extensions. We find that it is. We then use our more general specification
to produce two alternative measures of the contributions of reform to changes
in growth performance within the region. The first measure involves estimating
the contribution of our broadest set of reform measures to increasing the long-
run growth rates both of individual Latin American countries and of the region
as a whole. We estimate that the reforms implemented to date will have persis-
tent—albeit quite different—growth effects for almost all of the countries in
our sample, as well as a significant positive effect on sustainable growth for the
region in the aggregate, estimated at 1.8 percent a year. The second measure of
performance is based on the observed growth acceleration in the region
between 1991–95 and 1986–90. We conclude that the growth acceleration
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external environment during the reform period.
We then implement the growth gap approach to assessing the adequacy of
the growth effects of reform. To do so, we require a measure of the “desired”
growth rate. We use three alternative definitions, based on growth in the region
in the 1970s and contemporaneous growth in two other regions, and decom-
pose the corresponding growth gaps based on our results. Regarding the
historical comparison for Latin American countries, we find that in most coun-
tries current macroeconomic policy is significantly more conducive to growth
and, in the absence of a substantial deterioration of exogenous factors, would
have led to surpassing the growth target. The central finding in the cross-
region comparison is that, in the aggregate, while there is room for intensi-
fying reforms in the directions already implemented to substantially increase
growth, achieving the desired growth rates is likely to require a broadening of
the scope of the reform effort. We conclude by summarizing the results, offer
some tentative interpretations, and point to potentially fruitful areas of future
research.
I. Reexamining the Evidence
This section consists of four parts. After discussing our statistical methodology,
we take up the extensions listed above one at a time, and examine in each case
whether the conclusion that the growth payoff to reform has not been disap-
pointing in the narrow sense proves to be robust to the specific extension. 
Statistical Methodology
Our empirical methodology is based on the estimation of panel growth regres-
sions. The panel consists of a sample of 69 countries, 18 of which are in Latin
America, with data spanning the period 1961–95. This is the largest panel of coun-
tries for which relevant information is available. We divided the period into seven
five-year subperiods, two for each decade, and constructed five-year averages of
our variables where appropriate, both contemporaneous and lagged.3 The use of a
large panel of countries over an extended period of time allows us sufficient
degrees of freedom to enrich the menu of variables used to measure reform and to
control for nonreform growth determinants, as well as to engage in some explo-
ration of growth dynamics associated with the adoption of macroeconomic
reforms. 
Since one of our objectives in this paper is to use our estimated relationship
between macroeconomic policies and economic growth to implement the growth
gap approach, we have conducted our estimation in level form to permit us to esti-
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3The data were averaged over time in an attempt to eliminate short-run business cycle dynamics while
allowing us to test for longer-run reform dynamics. Failure to eliminate short-run dynamics typically leads
to highly correlated time series and to gross overestimation of true statistical accuracy. The choice of five-
year periods follows a common practice in the growth literature, implicitly reflecting the view that a five-
year period is sufficiently long to remove business cycle effects in international data.mate the growth effects of country-specific “permanent” structural factors through
country-specific intercept terms (that is, we adopt a “fixed-effects” model).
Consequently, the resulting estimation of the growth contribution of the macroe-
conomic reform variables included in the regression is not distorted by the attri-
bution of permanent cross-country differences in growth to differences in
time-invariant aspects of the policy environment.4 We controlled for time-specific
growth effects emanating from changes in the external economic environment
(resulting from technological, financial, or other sources) across periods by
including time dummies. Finally, our explanatory variables also included a set of
traditional cross-country growth determinants as control variables.5 The basic
static estimation equation is thus:
(1)
where git, the explained variable, is the real per capita growth rate of GDP in
country i (i ranging from 1 to 69) during period t (t ranging from 1 to 7). The first
two terms are the structural country dummy and the time dummy, respectively.
Macroeconomic reform variables are denoted by r and control variables by c. Our
reform variables included the rate of inflation, the share of government consump-
tion in GDP, the ratio of broad money to GDP, the black market premium, and a
conventional measure of openness (the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to
GDP). The set of control variables consisted of the GDP per capita and the level
of educational attainment inherited from the previous period (that is, at the begin-
ning of each five-year period), and the international terms of trade prevailing for
each country on average during the current period.6 The empirical counterparts of
all of the variables are described in the data appendix.7
Our reform variables are among the most widely used policy indicators in the
cross-country growth literature. Since these variables are in effect macroeconomic
outcomes themselves, however, endogeneity is a potentially important problem
under Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, possibly leading to a magnifica-
tion of estimated growth effects through reverse causality. In principle, this
gs w a rb cu it i t it it it =+ + + + ,
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4In contrast, purely cross-country studies cannot control for structural country-specific differences
unless untestable statistical assumptions are made to justify a “random-effects” model—that is, the
absence of correlation between the structural terms and the explanatory variables. In this context, this
practice appears particularly worrisome because, as explained later, our testing of that assumption with
this panel indicates that random-effect growth models are biased.
5Note that since investment is not included among the control variables in the regressions reported
below, growth effects should be interpreted as overall effects, inclusive of effects operating through invest-
ment rates. 
6The estimated effects of “initial” GDP per capita and education should be interpreted with care
because they refer to convergence effects within a five-year period, especially when compared with esti-
mates from cross-section regressions. 
7As is customary, many of the explanatory variables are used in logarithmic form and their corre-
sponding coefficients have a semi-elasticity interpretation. However, neither the statistical significance of
these variables nor their overall growth effects is sensitive to this specification. problem could be addressed (at least in part) by using as reform indicators vari-
ables that more narrowly capture specific policy instruments. However, aside from
the availability of such variables, the presumed superiority of using policy reform
variables is weakened by the fact that policies that lack credibility are ineffective
and would introduce biases if credibility is not controlled for, while outcome vari-
ables implicitly filter out ineffective policies. Moreover, the very presumption of
positive biases under OLS is itself doubtful under close scrutiny. The traditional
argument that outcome reform variables yield positive endogeneity biases because
of reverse causation misses the opposite effect attributable to the so-called crisis
hypothesis, according to which crises help the implementation of reform, thus
inducing negative reverse causality. 
Nevertheless, to test the appropriateness of OLS estimation, we conducted
instrumental variable estimation using the lagged values of inflation and financial
depth as instruments (as well as the rest of the explanatory variables). Under the
reasonable assumption that these instruments are exogenous, IV estimation is
consistent. A comparison of the point estimates of the macroeconomic reform
variables, however, did not point to a systematic OLS magnification bias, since the
IV estimates of the effects of openness, government consumption, and financial
deepening—three out of the five policy proxies—were larger than the OLS esti-
mates. In fact, the point estimate of the overall growth effect of reform obtained
under both estimation methods is almost identical. A Hausman specification test
showed very strongly that the consistency of OLS could not be rejected on the
basis of this IV estimation. At the same time, the accuracy of the IV estimates was
clearly lower than that of OLS; this implies that, all things considered, OLS
appears to be the best choice between the two estimation methods.
Because the imprecision of the IV estimates may derive from the poor quality
of the exogenous instruments available in this case, we also resorted to indirect
evidence to satisfy ourselves that it was not worthwhile to complicate the statis-
tical approach to the problem and that OLS would be reasonably unbiased, by
comparing our results to those of ELM. We found that our simple methodology
was able to closely reproduce the results of the more sophisticated econometric
methodology employed in ELM to implement IV estimation in a dynamic panel.
For all of these reasons, we used OLS as our estimation method. 
A second econometric issue concerns the appropriate technique for panel esti-
mation. Under the assumption that the country-specific effects are orthogonal to
the regressors r and c, a random-effects model, in which the country-specific
effects are controlled for within the regression error term, is consistent and more
efficient than the fixed-effects model posited above. However, a Hausman specifi-
cation test shows that the estimations from the fixed-effects model and those from
the random-effects model are significantly different at extremely high confidence
levels, thus indicating that the random-effects model yields inconsistent estimates
in this case. In other words, the validity of the orthogonality assumption required
for consistency is rejected with virtually total confidence. Therefore, the best
choice between the two methods to analyze this panel appears to be fixed-effects
OLS. An important implication is that the convenient use of the orthogonality
assumption in the context of cross-section growth regressions, in which context
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cannot be tested, is not only unwarranted but very likely invalid. 
In preliminary estimates of the basic equation, the openness variable failed to
be statistically significant at conventional confidence levels (p-value of 25
percent), while the other four macroeconomic reform variables had estimated
coefficients with the theoretically appropriate signs that were statistically signifi-
cant at least at the 97 percent confidence level. Separating the effects of openness
by region, the variable entered with the appropriate sign for all regions except
Africa, where it was statistically significantly negative. We concluded that the
failure of the openness variable in this panel was associated with the role of the
variable for the African countries. One possible explanation is the effect of
compensatory external financial aid to Africa, which may induce a negative corre-
lation between growth performance and openness. Given the ambiguity of inter-
pretation, we chose to eliminate openness from the basic static specification.8
Basic Static Equation
The results of estimating the basic equation without this variable are displayed in
Table 1 (specification 1). Notice first that the Durbin-Watson statistic adjusted by
the 68 cross-country residual differences of this panel (2.05) strongly supports the
hypothesis of zero serial autocorrelation of residuals. Therefore OLS is efficient
and the reported precision of the estimations is reliable. All the stabilization and
structural reform variables are correctly signed, and are highly significant (p-value
of less than 4 percent). In particular, we find a substantial and statistically signif-
icant positive marginal growth impact associated with lower public consumption,
lower inflation, financial deepening, and exchange rate unification. Control vari-
ables all have the expected signs as well: positive for education and changes in the
terms of trade, and negative for initial per capita GDP.9 All but that for the educa-
tion variable (p-value of 40 percent) are also highly significant. Changes in the
external environment—captured by the time dummies—appear to have had
growth effects that were both substantial and statistically significant. In particular,
the external growth environment in the 1990s appears to be about as negative as in
the first half of the 1980s, when the debt crisis hit—down by about 1 percentage
point relative to the second half of the 1980s. This finding is consistent with other
studies and also with casual observation: relative to the previous five-year period,
growth slowed in all regions, including East Asia, except in Latin America. Not
only in Africa, but also in member countries of the Organization for Economic
Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Peter Montiel
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8Though we chose to eliminate openness as a separate explanatory variable, we capture it below
through the Structural Policy Index, as discussed later. Another strategy could have been to eliminate
Africa from the study and keep openness as an explanatory variable. Sensitivity analyses comparing runs
with and without African countries showed that the removal of Africa does not introduce statistically
significant changes in the coefficients of interest. It marginally dampens most of the estimated coefficients
(albeit it magnifies the effect of exchange rate unification), but their significance and the overall conclu-
sions of the exercise remain. We chose to keep Africa to gain in statistical precision.
9The so-called speed-of-convergence parameter associated with the latter is consistent with that found
in ELM. Cooperation and Development (OECD) growth slowed by more than 11/2
percentage points. 
More important, the evidence suggests that the growth response to recent
reform in Latin America is not inferior to what international experience would
lead us to predict. In fact, growth in Latin American countries during the first half
of the 1990s actually exceeds what should be expected according to these esti-
mates (the average residual is positive for countries in the region during the last
five-year period, amounting to 0.53 percentage points of growth). Moreover, if a
Latin American dummy for the reform period 1991–95 is added, it comes out posi-
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Table 1. Explaining Annual Per Capita GDP Growth 
(percent)
Excluding Structural Policy Index
(2): Dynamic
(1): Static (Lags underneath)
Explanatory variables
Stabilization and structural reform
Lower public consumption 2.9 (0.6) 3.5 (0.8)
–1.2 (0.8)
Lower inflation 1.5 (0.5) 1.6 (0.6)
–0.3 (0.6)
Financial deepening  1.0 (0.5) 1.5 (0.6)
–0.2 (0.7)
Exchange rate unification 2.2 (0.5) 2.3 (0.5)
–0.3 (0.6)
Control variables
Initial GDP –2.4 (0.5) –3.0 (0.7)
Education 0.23 (0.3) 0.57 (0.4)
Terms of trade 5.5 (2.3) 6.4 (2.5)
Worldwide cycle
1966–70 0 0
1971–75 0.66 (0.3) 0.49 (0.4)
1976–80 0.68 (0.4) 0.18 (0.4)
1981–85 –0.92 (0.4) –1.54 (0.5)
1986–90 0.14 (0.5) –0.59 (0.6)
1991–95 –0.82 (0.5) –1.58 (0.7)
Number of observations 441 376
Adjusted R5 0.56 0.60
DW statistic 2.05 1.99
Latin America 1991–95
Average residual 0.53 0.39
Dummy 0.94 (0.59) 0.79 (0.61)
Note: Standard error estimates are given in parentheses.tive and has a p-value of 13 percent. The implication is that there is no reason for
disappointment with the growth response to the reforms undertaken during the
1990s. The full extent of the underlying growth progress owing to reform is
partially hidden by an adverse external environment, which accounts for a growth
downturn of about 1 percentage point (–0.82 + –0.14 = –0.96). These results
suggest that expectations that do not take into account the adverse external envi-
ronment would be erroneous in finding the post-reform growth acceleration to be
disappointing. If anything, the evidence is consistent with the view that recent
reform in Latin America led to surprisingly fast growth.10 These results are
broadly similar to those obtained by ELM. 
Two additional tests lend further support to this conclusion. First, the hypoth-
esis that the coefficients of the four policy variables in Latin America were statis-
tically equal to those in the other regions in the panel was directly tested and could
not be rejected. Second, the results indicate that, while growth in the region in the
late 1980s is well explained by the model, growth significantly exceeded the
model’s prediction for the 1990s. In other words, it is only in the 1990s that the
Latin American residuals are sizable (their average in the late 1980s was actually
negative, at –0.04). This suggests that the excess growth identified in the recent
period is due to actual acceleration (of 0.57 points as measured by average resid-
uals) rather than model misspecification inducing a systematic Latin American
misfit. 
Basic Dynamic Equation
The previous specification does not address the dynamics of the growth response,
implicitly assuming that a five-year period is sufficient for the long-run implica-
tions of changes in the explanatory variables to become manifest. However, stabi-
lization and structural reform typically set in motion complex business cycle
dynamics. Furthermore, growth theory suggests that macroeconomic policy has, at
least to a partial extent, an income level effect that translates into a transitory
growth effect. If five years are not enough to eliminate short-run fluctuations, it
may very well be that long-run effects are overestimated in the static panel regres-
sion.11 On the other hand, if some of the growth effects are worked out only after
a long delay, then the above estimates based on five-year averages would under-
estimate the effect of reform. In either case, the growth equations estimated in
Table 1 would have been misspecified by omitting lagged values of the reform
variables. 
This possibility is testable. If valid, it has the important implication that future
growth performance will differ from current performance, even if no further
reforms are enacted. Depending on the direction of this effect, this may call for
Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Peter Montiel
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10Note that, while the latter is consistent with Krugman’s (1995) view that foreign investor exuber-
ance may have caused growth in the region to be temporarily high in the 1990s, the former implies that
this cannot be combined with the observation that growth has fallen short of expectations to draw the
conclusion that the reforms have failed.
11This would be the case if, for example, as established in Inter-American Development Bank (1996),
short-run economic booms follow stabilization and structural reform. either less or more policy response to a growth performance that is deemed inad-
equate, compared with a situation in which long-run growth effects materialize
within a five-year period. To address these issues, we specified our basic equation
in dynamic form, adding the lagged values of the four macroeconomic reform
variables (r ):
(2)
The long-run effect of reform, that is, the effect that would prevail if reform were
sustained, is given by the sum of the contemporaneous and the delayed impacts. If
the latter is negative, some of the growth gains would be lost in the future. If posi-
tive, additional growth would occur effortlessly.
The results of including lagged reform variables in the basic equation are
reported in Table 1 as specification 2.12 As shown in the table, the coefficients of
the lagged reform variables are all opposite in sign to those of the corresponding
contemporaneous variables. However, the lagged coefficients are quite small in
absolute value, leaving substantial positive long-run effects for each of the four
reform variables. None of the delayed effects is clearly statistically significant
individually, but they are strongly significant jointly. This dynamic specification
marginally improves upon the static one according to standard statistical
measures, as well as with regard to the qualitative features of the results. As
measured by the adjusted R-square, the fit of this dynamic specification is slightly
better than that of its static counterpart. Moreover, in the dynamic specification,
education is statistically significant (p-value of 14 percent). The evidence thus
suggests the presence of a minor partial offset to the beneficial growth effect of
stabilization and reform after five years.
The previous conclusion, however, that the growth response to reform in the
1990s has not been disappointing (in the narrow sense) continues to hold in the
dynamic specification. The hypothesis that the coefficients associated with the
four reform variables, both contemporaneous and lagged, are equal for Latin
America and the rest of the world cannot be rejected at conventional confidence
levels (p-value of 27 percent). Taking into account policy dynamics, the observed
growth acceleration in Latin America still exceeded expectations by an average of
0.43 percentage points (the average residual in the late 1980s remains at –0.04) .
With this new dynamic specification, however, growth in the 1990s is statistically
within what the model would predict. The Latin America 1991–95 dummy loses
statistical significance in the dynamic specification (p-value of 22 percent). 
gs w a ra rb cu it i t it it it it =+ + + + + '' .
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12In this case as well, the openness variable, both current and lagged, can be jointly rejected with a
log-likelihood ratio test at the 15 percent level. Discriminating by region, the long-run effect of openness
in Latin America was not significantly positive. We chose to eliminate the openness variable from this
basic dynamic regression too.Extending the Reform Coverage
Our basic equations, and the empirical panel literature in general, use a relatively
short list of macroeconomic policy reform outcomes to capture the growth impact
of a wide range of reform policies as a substitute for the direct measurement of
policy instruments. While many policy stances can be expected to be proxied
reasonably well by their predictable and easily measured outcomes, some poten-
tially important reforms, such as tax reform or even trade reform, may not be
adequately captured. The lack of broad and consistent information on actual policy
instruments has precluded their use in the empirical panel literature. However,
Lora (1997) has recently produced a Structural Policy Index for most Latin
American countries over the last decade of our sample period that may contain
important additional information to incorporate into the statistical methodology.
To achieve a more comprehensive coverage of reform policies, therefore, we
augmented our set of “reform” variables to include the Structural Policy Index. 
Let Iit denote the index for country i in subperiod t over the entire panel. When
the underlying index is available, this variable can be derived by computing the
five-year averages of the underlying annual index for 1986–90 and 1991–95.
Consider the modified dynamic regression equation:
(3)
This specification is an improvement over our previous one to the extent that the
coefficient f is positive and statistically significant. The growth contribution of the
macroeconomic policy package in this specification is arit +  a r  it +  fIit.
Unfortunately, this index is available only for Latin America and only for the
period 1985–95. Thus, it only covers a small fraction of the panel. To use the
index, therefore, statistical assumptions are needed to complete the missing infor-
mation. The following two statistical assumptions about how to estimate Iit when
it is not available give rise to simple estimating equations:
Full coordination (Assumption A)
To the extent that reforms are interlinked and coordinated, it may be that the four
macroeconomic reform variables used above already capture growth effects that in
reality arise from other reforms that have been omitted from our estimated regres-
sion, but that are included in the index.13 To capture the overall growth effects of
reform, the relevant question is how much information the index contains that is
not already captured by the explanatory variables previously included in the
regression. Suppose that reforms are typically coordinated. The determination of
the policy index can then be specified as:
gs w a ra rb cf Iu it i t it it it it it =+ + + + + + ''
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13If so, this is an argument against attributing specific contributions to individual policies based on
the previous econometric results.(4)
If the predictive equation di + prit provides a good approximation of the value of
the index (that is, if it accounts for almost all of the variation in the index), then
the introduction of the index Iit into the growth equation would make no difference
for its overall fit, because the index is spanned by variables already used. However,
when the index contains independent information, it may contribute to improving
the goodness of fit. In the event, the specification in equation (4) turns out to
explain about 70 percent of the total variation of the index where it is observed,
according to the adjusted R-squared statistic. The estimates of the four parameters
associated with the reform variables are positive and statistically significant, with
at least 90 percent confidence. One interpretation of these results is that the struc-
tural reforms reflected in the index have tended to be coordinated with the macro-
economic reform variables included in r, but the index nevertheless contains
independent information. 
Our first approach to exploiting this information is to assume that when the
index is not available, it can be closely approximated by the above-mentioned
predictive function of the four reform variables (and arbitrary country-specific
structural differences to control for cross-country structural differences). We refer
to this as Assumption A. To implement it, let eit be the residual from equation (4),
taking on the value vit when the index is available and 0 otherwise; eit can thus be
interpreted as capturing components of reform that were uncorrelated with
macroeconomic policy variables. Implicitly, we are assuming that there was no
time variation in this dimension of reform where the index is not observed.
Consider the following equation:
(5)
Under the assumption just described, this equation is equivalent to (3). The growth
contribution of the macroeconomic policy package is now what is directly
obtained from all of the reform variables, that is, arit + a r  it + feit. 
The corresponding estimations are shown in column 1 of Table 2.14 The coef-
ficient f has a positive sign and is statistically significant (p-value of 8 percent).
This new specification does not have much effect on the estimated coefficients of
the other variables or on the overall fit of the growth regression, but it has the
effect of raising expected Latin American growth during 1991–95, thus explaining
more of the acceleration with respect to the previous five-year period than the
equation that excludes the index. The Latin American 1991–95 dummy is
gs w a ra rb cf eu it i t it it it it it =+ + + + + + '' .
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14A dynamic version including both the error and its lag was attempted, but both coefficients were
individually insignificant in the statistical sense.statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p-value of 38 percent). Still, the
growth acceleration in the region on average continues to exceed expectations,
though now by only 0.19 percentage points.
Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Peter Montiel
534
Table 2. Explaining Annual Per Capita GDP Growth 
(percent)
Including  Structural Policy Index
(3): Assumption A (4): Assumption B
(Lags underneath) (Lags underneath)
Explanatory variables
Stabilization and structural reform
Lower public consumption 3.4 (0.8) 3.2 (0.8)
–1.1 (0.8) –1.0 (0.8)
Lower inflation 1.5 (0.6) 1.5 (0.6)
–0.2 (0.6) 0.1 (0.7)
Financial deepening 1.5 (0.6) 1.4 (0.6)
–0.2 (0.7) –0.1 (0.7)
Exchange rate unification 2.3 (0.5) 2.2 (0.5)
–0.4 (0.6) –0.4 (0.6)
Structural policy index (residual) 15.8 (9.0) — —
Structural policy index (change) — — 5.9 (2.9)
Control variables
Initial GDP –3.0 (0.7) –2.8 (0.7)
Education 0.56 (0.39) 0.59 (0.39)
Terms of trade 6.2 (2.5) 6.4 (2.5)
Worldwide cycle
1966–70 0 0
1971–75 0.49 (0.4) 0.45 (0.4)
1976–80 0.19 (0.4) 0.13 (0.4)
1981–85 –1.52 (0.5) –1.60 (0.5)
1986–90 –0.53 (0.6) –0.73 (0.6)
1991–95 –1.62 (0.7) –1.90 (0.7)
Number of observations 376 376
Adjusted R5 0.60 0.60
DW statistic 1.99 1.98
Latin America 1991–95
Average residual 0.28 –0.06
Dummy 0.59 (0.62) –0.17 (0.86)
Note: Standard error estimates are given in parentheses.No coordination (Assumption B)
The alternative statistical assumption (Assumption B) is that instead of perfect
coordination with the four reform variables, no coordination is present—that is,
the Structural Reform Index contains information that is independent of the
included variables. In a sense, then, this assumption is the opposite of the previous
one. In this case, the policy index would be specified as:
(6)
This equation explains about 50 percent of the total variation of the index
according to the adjusted R-squared statistic. If the corresponding predictive equa-
tion di is taken as a good approximation of the value of the index, then the intro-
duction of the index Iit, as in equation (3), would make no difference for the overall
fit, since the country dummies would already contain the relevant information.
The actual observed index, however, may contribute to explaining growth when it
is available. To use it, we again need to make assumptions about its value when it
is not observed. We make the same assumption that we did previously: when the
index is not observable, it remains constant over time. Thus, let eit be the relevant
residual. It is assumed to take on the value vit when the index is available, and 0
otherwise. An important difference in this case, though, is that under the assumed
predictive function, it makes sense to specify Latin America’s vector of dummies
di as the observed, out-of-sample, pre-reform 1985 value of the index. Therefore,
vit = Iit – Ii,85. This means that for countries in Latin America, the constant value is
taken to be that observed in 1985, while for other countries, the constant index
level is arbitrary. 
The corresponding estimations are shown in column 2 of Table 2.15 The coef-
ficient f again has a positive sign and is statistically significant (p-value of 4
percent). This alternative totally eliminates the excess of observed Latin American
growth. Even under this extreme case, however, the growth response to reform
remains not disappointing (it is almost exactly as expected, at 0.02). The Latin
American 1991–95 dummy turns out to be negative, but it is statistically insignif-
icant (p-value of 81 percent).
We conclude that the Structural Policy Index contains useful information.
Thus, the overall conclusion under the growth impetus approach is that, judging
by international and historical standards, the growth response of recent reform in
Latin America—that is, its marginal effect—was adequate. Since the validity of
the inferences also depends on untestable statistical assumptions, however, the
results must be interpreted with caution. 
Id v it i it =+ .
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15A dynamic version including both the error and its lag reproduced the partial dynamic offset found
for the other macroeconomic reform variables. For comparability, the statistically insignificant lagged
variable was dropped.Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Peter Montiel
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II. Long-Run Growth Effects and Growth Acceleration
Determining whether reform measures had the growth effects that would have
been predictable on the basis of international evidence is only the first step,
however, in assessing the adequacy of the growth effects of reform. We now turn
to an examination of the magnitude of the actual growth impact of the reforms in
two different ways. First, we apply the new estimates of growth determinants
derived in the last section to quantify the long-run contribution of stabilization and
structural reform in the 1990s to per capita growth in Latin American countries,
that is, its contribution to sustainable growth acceleration. Second, we measure the
growth acceleration induced by reforms relative to the previous period. 
Before proceeding, it may be worth noting that, in general, the growth contri-
bution of the overall macroeconomic policy stance is what is directly obtained
from the reform variables—that is, arit + a r it + feit, plus the unknown contribu-
tion fdi which, as explained previously, is absorbed by the country dummies. This
last term is constant and therefore irrelevant for assessing the contribution of a
macroeconomic policy reform package in a given country (as in Tables 3–5
below). However, it becomes relevant for the decomposition of cross-regional
growth gaps into the portions contributed by policy and by other factors (as in
Table 6 below). Thus, assumptions regarding this last term in non–Latin American
countries are needed to decompose cross-regional growth gaps under this scenario.
Fortunately, the evidence suggests that a particularly simple assumption—that the
unobserved aggregate di tends to be equal across regions—may well be realistic.
Specifically, the Latin American country dummies estimated from the growth
regression turn out to be uncorrelated with the out-of-sample, pre-reform values of
the Structural Policy Index for individual countries in 1985. This finding suggests
that systematic differences in the unobservable policy index across countries are
fully absorbed by differences in the four measured macroeconomic reform vari-
ables and, therefore, the expected value of di can reasonably be taken to be
constant across countries.
The Long-Run Growth Effects of Reform
The long-run growth effects of the reforms can be derived by multiplying the sum
of the current and lagged coefficients of each of the reform variables by the change
in that variable from 1986–90 to 1991–95 and aggregating over all of the reform
variables.16 Table 3 shows these estimations as additional percentage points in
annual growth on a country-by-country basis, as well as their sensitivity to the
aggregation method and the statistical assumptions used for incorporating the
Structural Policy Index. In almost all countries it is estimated that stabilization and
16The long-run growth effects and decompositions of growth gaps presented in this and the following
section are based on a model that incorporates the Structural Policy Index under the coordination assump-
tion (Assumption A), under which the four macroeconomic reform variables in the model already capture
much of the index. This case appears to be intermediate between the exclusion of the index and its incor-
poration under the no-coordination assumption. The conclusions in both sections, however, are robust to
the alternatives.structural reform made a substantial contribution to long-run growth as measured
by all of the estimation methods. The preferred specification is the one in which
the Structural Policy Index was introduced under Assumption A, in which case the
typical country, as measured by the simple average, experienced a sustainable
growth increase estimated at about 1.6 percentage points a year (with a standard
deviation of 0.3). To the extent that reforms do not affect population growth, the
best estimate of growth effects in the region as a whole is obtained through the
GDP-weighted average of country growth effects, as opposed to a population-
weighted average. By this method, the contribution of stabilization and structural
reform to aggregate long-run growth is estimated at about 1.8 percentage points a
year (with a standard deviation of 0.4). Other methods yield roughly similar
results. 
Therefore, the conclusion that recent stabilization and structural reform made
a significant contribution to sustainable growth appears to apply to almost all indi-
vidual countries and to be robust to these alternative methodologies. In the long
run, if reforms are sustained, some of the current gains achieved in the first half of
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Table 3. Long-Run Contribution of
Macroeconomic Reforms to Growth 
Long-Run Contribution of Stabilization and Structural Reform
Including Structural Policy Index
Excluding Structural
Policy Index Assumption A Assumption B
Argentina 2.89 3.09 4.62
Bolivia 1.25 0.85 2.03
Brazil 0.73 1.42 1.21
Chile 0.60 0.34 0.73
Colombia 0.34 0.75 0.61
Costa Rica –0.14 1.16 0.20
Ecuador 1.30 2.16 2.20
El Salvador 3.70 2.28 4.39
Guatemala 1.38 2.57 2.22
Honduras 0.87 2.12 0.74
Haiti 1.10 –1.62 0.67
Jamaica 0.53 1.85 0.98
Mexico 0.93 1.73 1.84
Peru 4.07 4.07 6.08
Paraguay 0.30 1.46 0.97
Trinidad and Tobago 1.16 2.80 1.97
Uruguay 0.89 0.78 1.67
Venezuela 1.62 1.52 2.00
Typical country (simple average) 1.30 1.63 1.92
Regional aggregate 
(GDP-weighted average)  1.31 1.84 2.17Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Peter Montiel
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Table 4. Latin America: Decomposition of Changes in Per Capita
Growth, 1991–95 Compared with 1986–90
Typical Country Regional Aggregate
Stabilization and structural reform 1.88 2.21
Current reform 1.95 2.00
Past reform –0.07 0.21
Control variables 0.11 0.19
Income –0.05 0.04
Education 0.07 0.18
Terms of trade 0.09 –0.03
Other factors –0.94 –0.92
Unmeasured external factors –1.09 –1.09
Transitory differences 0.15 0.32
Aggregation 0.00 –0.15
Total growth rate increase 1.05 1.48
Table 5. Latin America: Decomposition of Per Capita Growth
Reduction, 1991–95 Compared with 1976–80
Growth Shortfall 
Growth Contributions in the Period (1991–95 Relative
Reforms External factors Other factors to 1976–80)
Argentina 1.00 –1.60 3.76 –3.16
Bolivia 1.58 –2.81 2.85 –1.62
Brazil –1.93 –1.58 1.93 1.58
Chile 1.67 –1.69 0.06 –0.04
Colombia –0.04 –2.21 1.42 0.83
Costa Rica 0.91 –1.92 0.96 0.05
Ecuador 2.45 –2.44 –2.26 2.25
El Salvador 2.86 –2.23 4.63 –5.26
Guatemala 1.46 –2.00 –2.02 2.57
Honduras 0.90 –2.01 –1.83 2.94
Haiti –1.41 –2.04 –7.45 10.90
Jamaica 3.51 –1.62 3.79 –5.68
Mexico 0.83 –1.86 –3.61 4.64
Paraguay 0.24 –1.67 –5.61 7.05
Peru 1.32 –2.06 4.49 –3.75
Uruguay 0.91 –1.60 0.16 0.53
Venezuela 0.54 –2.79 4.01 –1.76
Typical country  0.99 –2.01 0.31 0.71the 1990s will be lost owing to negative policy dynamics. If the reform level
during 1996–2000 equaled that of 1991–95, there would have been an estimated
aggregate dynamic per capita growth loss of 0.2 percentage points. 
Growth Acceleration
Another way to assess the growth effects of macroeconomic reform is to deter-
mine the growth increase they delivered relative to the pre-reform period. The
difference between average country growth performance during the reform period
1991–95, denoted by g1, and average growth performance in the same country in
the previous period, denoted by g0, can be expressed as follows:
(7)
where g1* = [r1* + c1* + w1*] and g0* = [r0* + c0* + w0*] are the fitted values of
the “preferred” growth equations from the introduction, using average values of
explanatory variables in the last five-year period and the previous period, respec-
tively. The first two terms on the right-hand side of this equation capture the
“explained” portion of any growth change in a Latin American country. In other
words, they measure the extent to which growth changes in Latin American coun-
tries can be explained by the variables that have been influenced by macroeco-
nomic reform (denoted by r) and systematic differences in the set of “control”
variables (denoted by c). The next term captures differences in the effects of
gg r r c c w w gg gg 10 1 0 1 0 1 0 11 00 −=− [] +− [] +− [] +− ( ) −− ( ) []
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Table 6. Decomposition of Per Capita Growth Gaps, Latin America
Compared with Other Regions, 1991–95
East Asia Miracle Countries OECD Countries
Stabilization and structural reform 2.52 1.92
Current reform 3.14 2.24
Past reform –0.62 –0.32
Control variables 0.19 –5.62
Income –0.32 –6.65
Education 0.52 0.95
Terms of trade 0.01 0.08




Growth rate shortfall 4.74 –0.55external factors (denoted by w, which can be interpreted as an exogenous tempo-
rary shock). This term captures the extent to which unaccounted international
exogenous factors related to growth (such as the debt crisis or productivity of new
inventions) account for differences in growth performance in Latin America. The
last term corresponds to the difference between Latin American growth residuals
in both periods—that is, the random (and transitory) portion of the difference in
growth performance between the two periods. This final term captures the extent
to which the recent growth response has been disappointing, in the sense of falling
short of what could reasonably have been expected on the basis of international
experience.
The above decomposition of the change in growth holds for each individual
country and, consequently, for the typical country as measured by the simple
average. The typical country experienced an average growth acceleration in the
period of slightly above 1 percentage point a year, but the contribution of recent
macroeconomic reform far exceeds this mark (see Table 4). In fact, the impact
effect of reform (current reform) is estimated at about 2 percentage points; this is
partially obscured by external exogenous factors, mainly a strong negative effect
of external factors accounting for more than 1 percentage point of growth reduc-
tion, while other explanatory variables played a relatively minor role and largely
offset each other. 
This conclusion also holds for the region as a whole. Although the above
decomposition does not hold in the aggregate, to the extent that population growth
rates are not affected by the explanatory variables considered in this growth
model, GDP-weighted averages exactly identify the aggregate growth contribu-
tions of these variables in all the growth gap decompositions analyzed in this
study, and the remaining statistical discrepancy is attributable to demographic
factors. The aggregate growth acceleration owing to stabilization and structural
reform during 1991–95 is therefore estimated at 2 percentage points a year. Had
this reform been deeper, its impact growth effect would have been correspondingly
larger when multiplied by the estimated marginal growth effects. For example, if
reforms had attained the levels observed in the OECD or the East Asian miracle
region, the resulting aggregate growth acceleration impact would have been 4.24
and 5.14 percentage points a year, respectively. The conclusion is that while
significant, the impact growth effect of reform fell short of half of its potential,
judged by these standards.
III. Accounting for Reform Effects: Growth Shortfalls
The question to be posed in this section is the following: Considering some abso-
lute standard of growth performance—we take it to be average Latin American per
capita growth rates during the 1970s, as well as both the average East Asian and
OECD growth levels during the Latin American reform period—how can the
shortfall between such a standard and the actual growth experience be explained
in terms of the growth determinants we have identified? We take up each of the
alternative standards of comparison in turn and show the results in Tables 5 and 6.
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Most Latin American countries grew faster in the 1970s than in the recent reform
period 1991–95; in fact, the typical country, obtained as a simple average of all
countries, experienced a growth rate about 0.70 percentage points a year lower.
However, this growth decline is not evidence of reform failure. When this growth
shortfall between the high growth period 1976–80 prior to the debt crisis and the
reform period 1991–95 is explained along the lines of the formula in the previous
section, as is done in Table 5, it becomes apparent that the macroeconomic reforms
contributed to a sizable increase in growth in almost all Latin American
countries.17 In fact, in the typical country, relative to the situation prevailing during
1976–80, better macroeconomic policy, as measured by the first term of the
decomposition formula, contributed to a growth improvement of about 1
percentage point a year.18 Such progress was more than offset by a severe deteri-
oration of the external growth environment in all countries, as measured by the
effects of external factors (contributing an estimated 1.81 percentage points a year
of growth reduction) and the international terms of trade of each country, which
resulted in a decline of about 2 percentage points a year for the typical country.
These two factors, macroeconomic reform and external environment, explain
growth performance well across the region. In fact, while other factors may have
been important for explaining performance in each individual country, they made
a modest contribution of about 0.3 percentage points in the typical country.19
Reform and Interregional Growth Gaps
A key advantage of panels including extraregional countries is that they permit us
to employ an alternative standard of comparison, relying on cross-regional
comparative analyses, to supplement the country-by-country time-series dimen-
sion. In this case, the unit of analysis cannot be the country. Instead, we compare
regional aggregates. The decomposition of the growth shortfall between aggregate
growth performance in Latin America and other regions during the reform period
1991–95 can also illustrate the role of recent reform and the remaining reform
agenda needed to close the growth gap. 
Suppose for concreteness that the East Asia miracle region is taken as a bench-
mark. The difference between aggregate East Asian growth performance during
this period, denoted by gEA, and aggregate Latin American growth performance,
gLA, can be expressed as follows:
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17Brazil is an important exception, owing mainly to its relatively late disinflation in the 1990s and, to
a lesser extent, increasing government consumption over the period. 
18The analysis of the regional aggregate would be misleading because it is distorted by the atypical
growth pattern of Brazil, which enters the average with heavy weight. The analysis of the regional aggre-
gate excluding Brazil is similar to the one obtained for the typical country.
19Improvements in education account for most of this contribution. Unidentified factors, as measured
by the residual of the regression in the fourth term of the decomposition formula, accounted for only 0.10
points. This positive residual differential further confirms that recent reform has not been disappointing in
a narrow sense.(8)
where gEA* = [rEA* + cEA* + sEA*] and gLA* = [rLA* + cLA* + sLA*] are the fitted
values of the preferred growth equations from the introduction using GDP-
weighted average values of explanatory variables for East Asian and Latin
American countries, respectively, and d is the demographic statistical discrepancy
discussed in the previous section. Again, the first two terms in the right-hand side
of this equation capture the explained portion of any Latin American aggregate per
capita growth shortfall. In other words, they measure the extent to which Latin
America’s growth performance can be explained by the variables that have been
influenced by macroeconomic reform (denoted by r) and systematic differences in
the set of control variables (denoted by c). The next term captures differences in
regional averages of country dummies (the structural differences). We interpret
this term as capturing the extent to which structural features of economies in the
two regions—that is, features that have been constant for some time and that are
related to growth performance—account for differences in aggregate growth
performance during Latin America’s reform period. The next to the last term
corresponds to the difference between East Asian and Latin American aggregate
growth residuals—that is, the random (and transitory) portion of the difference in
growth performance between the two regions during 1991–95. This term would
also capture the extent to which Latin America’s recent growth experience has
been disappointing, in the sense of falling short of what could reasonably have
been expected on the basis of international experience.
For the Latin American region as a whole, most of the enormous growth gap
with East Asia of almost 5 percentage points is explained by incomplete reform.
According to these estimates, if Latin America attained East Asian values for the
reform variables and they remained constant, the per capita growth gap would
shrink in the long run by 21/2 percentage points. The educational deficit in Latin
America is responsible for about 1/2 of 1 percentage point of the growth gap, most
of which is offset by the region’s relative poverty, which, everything else being
equal, facilitates growth (conditional convergence). Structural differences also
contribute to the growth gap, with their importance comparable in magnitude to
that of the educational deficit. About one third of the growth gap remains unex-
plained by the factors we have identified.
In contrast to East Asia, per capita growth in the OECD countries during the
1990s was slower than in Latin America. Given the enormous difference in income
per capita, reflected in the growth contribution of GDP per capita in Table 6, this
is not surprising. What is perhaps surprising is that differences in reform make a
smaller contribution in favor of the OECD than in the East Asian case. At the same
time, there are very significant structural differences in favor of the OECD coun-
tries (accounting for almost 4 percentage points of the growth gap); these are more
important than the contribution of stabilization and structural reform, estimated at
gg r r c c s s
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stages of development of the two regions. Coupled with this observation, the
significant East Asian growth residual suggests that part of the contribution
assigned to transitory factors in East Asia may be permanent in nature and that
East Asia may be following the steps of the OECD countries in this regard. 
The overall analysis of both decompositions suggests that, for the Latin
American region as a whole, there are significant growth gains to be achieved if
reforms, including in the area of educational policy, are deepened. Attaining East
Asian levels for the reform variables as well as for educational achievement would
substantially close the Latin America growth gap with the East Asian region and
possibly set the stage for other structural transformations as development is
advanced and the gains from the first generation of reforms are completed. 
IV. Conclusions
To summarize our findings, it is useful to consider alternative hypotheses that
could be offered to explain Latin America’s recent growth performance. The
simplest would be, of course, that the fundamental thrust of the reforms has been
misguided if the objective was to improve growth performance. We reject this
hypothesis. Not only does the weight of the evidence in the professional literature,
as well as our own results, support the view that the market-friendly reforms
implemented in the region to date should have been growth enhancing, but we
found no empirical evidence for the view that Latin America is “different” in this
regard—that is, we have found no evidence that the growth response to the reform
variables has been systematically different in Latin America than elsewhere.
Moreover, the growth impetus associated with the reforms has been substantial:
the estimated long-run growth effect of the 1990s reform is large for most coun-
tries in the region and amounts to almost 2 percentage points of additional annual
sustainable growth in the aggregate, enough to double the real income expected in
40 years (see Table 3). 
A second possibility that we were able to discard is that there is a Latin
American growth “puzzle,” in the sense that unidentified region-specific factors
depressed growth in Latin America during the 1990s, offsetting the large positive
growth impetus of the reforms just described. In fact, a time- and region-specific
dummy for the reform period in Latin America was statistically insignificant when
added to the panel growth equations. 
In short, even after extending the sample, broadening the set of reform indi-
cators, and taking into account possible dynamic effects, our findings are consis-
tent with those of ELM, in the sense that we found no evidence of disappointing
growth performance when disappointment is measured either in terms of the
marginal effects of the reforms or in terms of the overall growth impetus that they
imparted to Latin American countries during the reform period. 
Why, then, did Latin America not experience a more pronounced acceleration
of growth during 1991–95 leading to more satisfactory levels of growth? The
answer appears to lie in a combination of factors:
REFORM AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA
543•  The reforms were implemented in a relatively unfavorable external environ-
ment. The effect of implementing the reforms during 1991–95, instead of in
the previous five-year period, was to associate them with an international
context that by itself reduced the average growth rates of the reforming coun-
tries by about 1 percentage point. 
•  For growth to have accelerated more than it did would have required more
intensive reforms along the lines already implemented. We found evidence
that there is indeed room to move further in this direction, in the sense that
Latin America has not yet reached the levels of performance achieved in
faster-growing regions.
•  Our results would also support a case for more extensive structural and insti-
tutional reforms—that is, for broadening the scope of reform—because
pushing macroeconomic reforms to the levels of performance achieved in the
faster-growing regions would be insufficient for Latin America to close the
growth gap. Our results suggest that only about half of the annual growth gap
of about 5 percent between Latin America and East Asia during the reform
period can be closed by doing more of the same—that is, intensifying the
reform effort along the lines already undertaken. This conclusion emerges
with even greater force in comparison to the OECD, where structural differ-
ences account for an even larger share of the current difference in growth
performance relative to Latin America. This remaining gap suggests that the
scope of reform in Latin America will need to be broadened. Improvements in
macroeconomic management are simply not sufficient for Latin America to
achieve long-run growth rates comparable to those achieved in East Asia.
The final result of our study is, therefore, that while much has been painfully
achieved in Latin America, and while the reforms that have been implemented
have indeed delivered the boost in growth that they could have been expected to
provide on the basis of international evidence, reaching much higher long-term
growth rates in the region—beyond historical growth rates and approaching the
rates of high growth regions—will require both an intensification of reform along
the dimensions already implemented and a broadening of reform to incorporate
changes in structural characteristics of Latin American economies that are still
inhibiting growth in the region. Our results in this paper do not permit us to go
further in identifying such characteristics, but we have been able to document their
importance indirectly. A key item on the research docket for the region, therefore,
should be to identify desirable directions in which to extend the reform agenda, as
well as ways to make further progress in consolidating and intensifying the reform
efforts that are currently under way.
APPENDIX
The panel consists of the following 69 countries during 1961–95:
Latin America (18): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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544OECD (17): Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United
States.
Africa (18): Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Zaïre,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
East Asian miracle countries (5): Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Others (11): Bangladesh, Cyprus, Greece, India, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Philippines,
Portugal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
The period was divided into seven five-year subperiods: 1961–65, 1966–70, 1971–75,
1976–80, 1981–85, 1986–90, and 1991–95. Five-year simple averages of the available under-
lying yearly information were used. The resulting information panel was unbalanced because
of data limitations for some countries. Of a total of 482 possible observations, 37 were not
available.
Except when noted, the data sources used are Inter-American Development Bank, World
Bank, and IMF official information. The basic data were the real growth rate of per capita GDP;
real consumption as a proportion of real GDP; openness measured as real imports plus exports
as a proportion of real GDP; inflation rate based on monthly CPI; financial deepening measured
as the ratio of real M2 (deflated by year-end CPI) as a proportion of real GDP; real per capita
GDP at the beginning of each period; average years of secondary schooling in the total popu-
lation of 15+ years at the beginning of each period (Barro-Lee data set); terms of trade growth
rate; black market premium (for 1961–84 from Wood, 1988, and for 1985–95 from World
Currency Yearbook, 1996). 
The following variables were entered with a logarithmic transformation: openness ratio,
government consumption ratio, inflation (as 100+ inflation rate in percent), financial depth
ratio, initial GDP per capita, and black market premium (as 1+ premium).
Data on the Structural Reform Index (Latin America, 1985–95) are from Lora (1997).
The volatility of inflation was measured as the standard deviation of annual inflation rates. The
volatility of terms of trade was measured as the standard deviation of annual terms of trade
growth rates. The inequality of income distribution is the income of the richest quintile divided
by the income of the poorest two quintiles.
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